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ANALYSIS
Russia’s Failed Federalization Marches and the Simulation of Regional 
Politics
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Abstract:
Inspired by Russia’s insistence on federalization for Ukraine, activists in Novosibirsk attempted to organize 
a protest march in August 2014 to call for greater regional autonomy in Siberia. Authorities squelched the 
march almost as soon as the protest threatened to spread. Yet even as organizers were arrested and press 
reports censored, opposition leaders in Moscow and activists in Ukraine seized upon the news of the planned 
federalization marches and even invented new ones. The resulting spectacle revealed the Kremlin’s ongo-
ing fear of decentralizing power, the weak ties between central and regional opposition, and the boomerang 
effect of Russia’s intervention in Eastern Ukraine.
In August 2014, a new chapter was written in the trou-bled history of Russian federalism, though in the end 
it proved to be more farce than tragedy. For all appear-
ances, a perfect storm of nationalist and regionalist sen-
timent appeared to be taking the form of “federalization” 
marches in Russia’s regions, emboldened by the annexa-
tion of Crimea and its admission with the status of a fed-
eral republic in Russia’s federal system. What transpired 
was a logical and convincing simulation of a regionalist 
movement that provided a vivid illustration of the state 
of regional politics in today’s Russia.
For nearly fifteen years, the Kremlin steadily ren-
dered Russian federalism more ritualistic than substan-
tive. Russia’s experience with regionalism in the 1990s 
and the ever-present threat of separatism continue to jus-
tify political centralization and the diminishing role of 
regional politics. For Russia’s regions, then, the Krem-
lin’s demands for the federalization in Eastern Ukraine 
seemed surprising, if not hypocritical. Why should the 
Donbass benefit from federalism when Russia’s regions 
effectively have been deprived of it for years? For some 
observers, Russia’s tactics in Ukraine were likely to stim-
ulate a revival of regionalism—if not outright secession-
ism—in Russia. At a minimum, they created an oppor-
tunity for the opposition to demand the realization of 
federalist principles in Russia’s constitution.
The very structure of Russia’s ethno-federal system 
had been a source of discontent for opposition nation-
alists, as well, but for different reasons. While the 1993 
constitution recognized 21 “ethnic” republics named 
for non-Russian peoples, the vast majority of Russia’s 
regions are simply administrative-territorial (read: non-
ethnic) provinces. Opposition nationalists point to this 
difference in federal status as privileging minority eth-
nic interests and evidencing the “anti-Russian” nature 
of Russia’s ethno-federal system (a claim inherited from 
Soviet-era nationalists who argued the Soviet system 
discriminated against Russians). A common nationalist 
goal since the early 1990s had been the creation of eth-
nically Russian republics within Russia’s federal system 
in order to level up the status of Russian regions and to 
gain recognition of the ethnic Russian people as a core, 
state-bearing people. Consequently, Crimea’s annexa-
tion represented the long-awaited creation of Russia’s 
first ethnically Russian republic, setting a precedent for 
Russia’s provinces to challenge Moscow and demand ele-
vated status as republics.
These potentially powerful currents appeared to 
come together in a movement for the “Federalization 
of Siberia.” On July 24, 2014, a “March for the Federal-
ization of Siberia” in Novosibirsk was announced on the 
Russian social media website VKontakte, bearing the slo-
gan “Stop feeding Moscow!” (khvatit kormit' Moskvu!)—
a variation of the common nationalist slogan, “Stop feed-
ing the Caucasus.” It also prominently featured a picture 
of the Siberian Federal District with the slogan, “Let’s 
show Moscow Siberia!” (Pokazhem Moskve Sibir' !)1 The 
group initially claimed the goal of founding a “Siberian 
republic” within Russia, though this was later dropped 
after the city authorities objected. Despite this change, 
the march’s stated goals remained unchanged: (1) to 
introduce services and income enhancement for those 
living in harsh environmental conditions; (2) to reserve 
a share of taxes on resource extraction for regional bud-
gets for a “more just” distribution of local and federal 
budgets; and (3) to realize constitutional right for rel-
atively autonomous local government and to end the 
“idiotic situation” in which “all decisions are taken by 
Moscow without representation of Siberia’s interests.”
This combustive combination of regionalist and 
nationalist opposition to the Kremlin quickly gained 
traction in the online press in Russia. It was not the 
first time that Siberian regionalism received national 
1 “Marsh za federalizatsiiu Sibiri,” <https://vk.com/sibmarsh>, last 
accessed September 23, 2014.
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attention in recent memory. In 2011, the central press 
circulated sensationalist reports concerning an activist 
in Kemorovo, Vladimir Kiselev, who intended to orga-
nize a referendum on Siberia’s independence. Kiselev 
claimed that the referendum would be supported by the 
United States and result in Siberia becoming America’s 
fifty-first state, though he admitted to receiving no help 
from the Obama administration and confessed that he 
was, in fact, hoping for a change of administration in 
Washington.2
Copy-cat marches were hastily organized in Kras-
nodar and Ekaterinburg to coincide with the march in 
Novosibirsk. Moscow took notice. On July 30, 2014, 
the independent news site Slon.ru published an inter-
view with Artem Loskutov, the organizer of an annual 
satirical youth march featuring nonsensical, quasi-mil-
itaristic slogans in Novosibirsk known as Monstratsiia 
(“Monstration”). Loskutov discussed the rationale for 
the march, though he explicitly denied being its orga-
nizer or even its “ideologue.” The next day, Russia’s press 
watchdog, RosKomNadzor, accused Slon.ru of distrib-
uting material inciting mass public disturbances and 
forced it to delete the interview.3 Seventeen other news 
sites were compelled to delete reports of the story, while 
the BBC’s Russian website edited its report to comply 
with the state’s demand. The march’s page on VKon-
takte was taken down briefly, and the search term for 
“federalization of Siberia” disappeared from Google.ru.4
Shortly afterwards, organizers of the march were 
detained by police on a variety of petty charges and 
sentenced to two weeks in jail. Four organizers were 
detained in Novosibirsk, two in Ekaterinburg, and 
two in Omsk for attempting to organize an apparently 
related march. The organizer of an attempted march 
in Krasnodar, Dar'ia Poliudova, was arrested after an 
unknown male approached her on the street and pro-
voked an argument by accusing her repeatedly of being 
a nationalist. Following her 14 day sentence, she was 
not released and instead charged with extremism and 
threatening Russia’s territorial integrity. According to 
Krasnodar’s prosecutor’s office, Poliudova is accused of 
calling for Ukraine’s annexation of Krasnodar and the 
2 “Dissident iz Kuzbassa: ‘Prisoedinenie Sibiri k SShA neobra-
timo, kak vrashchenie Zemli vokrug Solntsa!’,” Tayga.info, June 
21, 2011. <http://tayga.info/details/2011/06/21/~104061>, last 
accessed September 20, 2014.
3 “Slon snial material po trebovaniiu Genprokuratury,” Slon.ru, 
August 1, 2014. <http://slon.ru/fast/russia/slon-snyal-material-
po-trebovaniyu-genprokuratury-1137502.xhtml>, last accessed 
September 20, 2014.
4 “Moscow Freaks Out About Federalization Rally… In Sibe-
ria,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 5, 2014. <http://
www.rferl.org/content/russia-separatism-rally-siberia/26515418.
html>, last accessed August 5, 2014.
introduction of Ukrainian troops in the region. If con-
victed, the charge bears a maximum sentence of five 
years in a prison colony.5
In Moscow, Russia’s mainstream opposition politi-
cians, including Boris Nemtsov and Aleksei Naval'nyi, 
seized upon the news of the planned marches and the 
Kremlin’s censorship to mock the government’s hyp-
ocritical fear of federalism at home while insisting 
upon federalization for Ukraine. Their involvement 
drew international attention and foreign media mis-
takenly named Loskutov as the march’s organizer. In 
fact, credit for organizing the march was claimed by 
Aleksei Baranov, coordinator of the “National-Bolshe-
vist Platform”—an opposition group which claims to 
have split from Eduard Limonov’s party over the latter’s 
stance on Ukraine. Baranov characterized the march 
as a “first attempt to loudly announce our presence” by 
calling attention to “the Kremlin’s hypocritical position 
on South-Eastern Ukraine.” At the same time, he con-
demned the liberal opposition for spoiling the protest by 
organizing in support of federalization.6 When called for 
initial questioning by the authorities, Baranov denied 
any separatist intent and instead stated that he sought 
the redistribution of wealth and nationalization of enter-
prises. Baranov reportedly received vague threats to life 
and limb, followed by the discovery of a severed sheep’s 
head left at his doorstep on August 15. Soon after, he 
was accused of having incited patrons at a bar (located 
in a village 500 kilometers from Novosibirsk) to par-
ticipate in the banned march.7 Another organizer from 
Baranov’s party, Mikhail Pulin, was detained in Altai 
krai, formally on suspicion of stealing a mobile phone.8
Adding fuel to the fire, Ukrainian media and online 
activists seized upon the news of the planned marches. 
Rumors spread in the Ukrainian media that the orga-
nizers of the march sought independence from Rus-
sia, “inspired by the experience of the Donbass.” How-
ever, many of the Ukrainian sites mistakenly associated 
the protest movement with an older orthodox-nation-
alist group, the Siberian Sovereign Union (Sibirskii 
derzhavnyi soiuz), whose leader, Aleksandr Budnikov, 
5 “Pervoe delo po ‘separatistkoi’ stat'e,” Russkaia planeta, Septem-
ber 4, 2014. <http://rusplt.ru/society/pervoe-delo-po-separatist-
skoy-state-12559.html>, last accessed September 21, 2014.
6 “Strasti po marshu ‘za federalizatsiiu Sibiri’,” Natsional-
Bol'shevistskaia Platforma, August 20, 2014. <http://www.sib 
info.su/news/nsk/1/51195.html>, last accessed September 21, 
2014.
7 “Organizatorami ‘marsha za federalizatsiiu Sibiri’ zainteresova-
las' politsiia,” tvrain.ru, August 17, 2014. <http://www.sibinfo.
su/news/nsk/1/51195.html>, last accessed September 23, 2014.
8 “V Sibiri zaderzhivaiut zaiavitelei marsha ‘za federalizatsiiu’,” 
Radio Svoboda, August 17, 2014. <http://www.svoboda.org/con 
tent/article/26534757.html>, last accessed September 23, 2014.
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 156, 5 December 2014 13
denied any role in the marches. Budnikov argued that 
the movement was artificial and that Loskutov would 
likely be co-opted by the Kremlin, while agreeing with 
the movement’s principles and condemning Putin’s 
regime as corrupt.9 Undaunted, Ukrainian bloggers and 
activists recirculated Russian and international press 
reports, created new “federalization march” pages on 
VKontakte, and conjured the threat of a growing, coor-
dinated regionalist movement within Russia by includ-
ing the hash tags of a dozen or more large Russian cit-
ies. One of Russia’s opposition figures, Ksenia Sobchak, 
may have been duped by this strategy, taking to Facebook 
to announce a gathering in Kaliningrad for a “Kalinin-
grad People’s Republic” on August 17—a call which was 
widely circulated but does not appear to have had any 
substance, and which featured a graphic that originated 
with one of the federalization sites started by Ukrainian 
activists on VKontakte. Perhaps predictably, counter-
vailing rumors on Russian social media linked the pro-
posed federalization marches (real or imagined) to the 
infiltration of provocateurs from Maidan who allegedly 
disguised themselves as Ukrainian refugees and sought 
to organize mass disturbances.10
In all three cities, city authorities denied permission 
for marches and rejected the slogan “Stop feeding Mos-
cow!” as extremist. Organizers retreated to organizing 
“gatherings” (skhod) that did not require permission from 
the city, and adopted safer slogans. In Novosibirsk, for 
instance, the march was re-named to “March for the 
inviolability of the constitutional structure of RF” with 
a new slogan “for observance of the principles of feder-
alism!” The gathering in Novosibirsk proved the largest 
of the three with just two dozen participants. In Ekater-
inburg, about 15–20 people showed up for the gather-
ing, including at least one person with a placard display-
ing the symbol of the Urals Republic that existed briefly 
in 1993. Police arrested one protestor wearing a t-shirt 
with the slogan “Stop feeding Moscow!” as well as one 
apparent provocateur. No meeting occurred in Krasn-
odar, where patriotic-nationalist groups arrived first on 
the scene, distributing St. George’s ribbons and prepar-
ing to drive away any protesters. In the absence of any 
actual federalization protestors, they instead attacked 
Viacheslav Martynov, characterized as an “anarchist” in 
the press, who wore blue and gold ribbons (Ukraine’s 
9 “Marsh ‘za federalizatsiiu Sibiri.’ Kakovy tseli i kto stoit za nim?” 
Sibirskii derzhavnyi soiuz, August 13, 2014. <http://sibpower.
com/publikaci/marsh-za-federalizaciyu-sibiri-kakovy-celi-i-kto-
stoit-za-nim.html>, last accessed September 21, 2014.
10 “‘Marsh za federalizatsiiu’ v Novosibirske narekli ‘maidanom’ 
s priezzhim boevikami iz Kieva,” Sibinfo.su, August 4, 2014. 
<http://www.sibinfo.su/news/nsk/1/51195.html>, last accessed 
September 21, 2014.
national colors) on his wrist. Police intervened and 
detained Martynov and his attackers, eventually releas-
ing the latter while Martynov was sentenced to 15 days 
in prison.11 Ironically, demonstrations held in support 
of Siberian federalization in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and 
Kharkiv attracted more participants than the actual 
gatherings in Russia.
In perhaps the final episode of this strange series 
of mostly non-existent federalization protests, fliers 
supporting federalization appeared in Surgut in early 
September as Khanty-Mansiiskii Automous Okrug 
(KhMAO) prepared for municipal elections. The fli-
ers demanded that KhMAO become a republic, featur-
ing the slogan “Stop feeding Moscow!” as well as “The 
north will be white! The north will be Russia!” They 
prominently displayed the logo of the nationalist youth 
organization Sovest' (“Conscience”) and called for cit-
izens to boycott the gubernatorial election and to vote 
for any party in municipal elections other than United 
Russia. Members of Sovest' only recently were charged 
with hooliganism for their role in city-wide melees with 
migrants from the Caucasus on June 30, 2014.12 The 
organization was further implicated in threats made to 
a journalist and a variety of other attacks carried out in 
the course of the election campaign in early September. 
The organization actively participated in the municipal 
election and its leadership denied any role in making 
the fliers on social media, declaring them to be nothing 
more than “black PR.”13 Local observers suggested the 
fliers were intended to weaken the regional authorities 
in advance of municipal elections by raising the sensi-
tive issue of separatism.14 Regional prosecutors continue 
to seek to have the fliers declared “extremist” without 
having identified its author(s).
In the final tally, the federalization marches dem-
onstrated the impoverished state of regional politics in 
Russia. Organizers initially showed proficiency with 
the use of social media to raise awareness, but their 
own parties disavowed them as quickly as they were 
arrested by the police. National opposition leaders’ ideo-
11 “Anarkhist, izbityi v khode ‘Marsha za federalizatsiiu Kubani’, 
poluchil 15 sutok aresta,” Yuga.ru, August 18, 2014. <http://
www.yuga.ru/news/341617/>, last accessed September 21, 2014.
12 “V Surgute razbiraiutsia v prichinakh massovoi draki. ‘Sovest'’ i 
diaspory dali svoi kommentarii,” Ugra-news.ru, June 30, 2014. 
<http://ugra-news.ru/article/845>, last accessed September 23, 
2014.
13 “V Surgute khotiat priznat' ekstremistkoi listovku s prizyvom k 
federalizatsii,” Sova-center.ru, September 19, 2014. <http://www.
sova-center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/2014/09/d30246/>, last 
accessed September 23, 2014.
14 “V ‘Tiumenskoi matreshke’ potrebovali federalizatsii,” Znak.
com, September 2, 2014. <http://znak.com/hmao/articles/02- 
09-19-18/102862.html>, last accessed September 21, 2014.
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logically inappropriate and factually inaccurate band-
wagoning betrayed their opportunism, as well as the 
weakness of ties between national and regional opposi-
tion movements. The entanglement of the federalization 
marches with the Ukrainian question doubtless mobi-
lized patriotic-nationalist groups who perceive the spec-
ter of Maidan in any nonconformist act or organized 
political opposition—though in this case, their per-
ceptions were reinforced by the active and visible roles 
played by Ukrainian social media activists and press. 
The central government demonstrated that it consid-
ers even poorly coordinated, under-funded, and under-
attended demonstrations in support of Russia’s formal 
constitutional principles to be threatening and imper-
missible. The coda in Surgut illustrated that this central 
intolerance for regionalism may even serve as a resource 
for combatants in municipal elections, particularly when 
votes are no longer decisive in local politics. Indeed, in 
drawing far more attention and generating more intrigue 
than the election campaigns unfolding simultaneously 
across a third of the country, the failed federalization 
marches provide a powerful indictment of the state of 
public politics in Russia’s regions.
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